Abstract-Ring and group signatures allow their members to anonymously sign documents in the name of the group. In ring signatures, members manage the group themselves in an adhoc manner while in group signatures, a manager is required. Moreover, k-times traceable group and ring signatures [1] allow anyone to publicly trace two signatures from a same user if he exceeds the a priori authorized number of signatures. In [2], Canard et al. give a 1-time traceable ring signature where each member can only generate one anonymous signature. Hence, it is possible to trace any two signatures from the same user. Some other works generalize it to the k-times case, but the traceability only concerns two signatures. In this paper, we define the notion of k-times full traceable ring signature (k-FTRS) such that all signatures produced by the same user are traceable if and only if he produces more than k signatures. We construct a k-FTRS called Ktrace. We extend existing formal security models of ktimes linkable signatures to prove the security of Ktrace in the random oracle model. Our primitive k-FTRS can be used to construct a k-times veto scheme or a proxy e-voting scheme that prevents denial-of-service caused by cheating users.
I. INTRODUCTION
Organization of elections is an old concern of Humanity. Therefore many kinds of elections have been invented. With the development of Internet and the progresses in cryptography, several e-voting schemes have been developed, see [3] for a survey. In all these systems the question of proxy voting exists independently of the form of the ballots and the counting phase. The problem is how a voting system can allow someone who cannot participate to the election to delegate his vote to someone else. In some elections, with the agreement of the voter, another voter can vote twice or more. Each voter can have different numbers of proxy-votes from 0 up to a limit fixed by the election rules. In traditional paper elections, using paper ballots and a transparent box, a cheater who voted with an extra false proxy vote, is a posteriori detected during the tally phase, hence the election is canceled. An electronic voting system should offer a proxy mechanism that is better than in a traditional system. Once a fraud is detected then the cheater should be identified in order to blame him. Moreover, anyone should be able to find all the ballots that he has introduced in the system in order to remove them from the final count. Such a mechanism would prevent having to reorganize the election.
Another close problem is the elaboration of the program committee of a conference, that is often done by the mem-bers of the steering committee. Usually each member of the steering committee anonymously proposes a list of names for the program committee. Some members might want to discard some names for personal reasons, but they do not want other members of the steering committee to learn their choices. Our aim is to construct a system that allows each member to anonymously express a maximum of k vetos. If one person gives more than k vetos then we want to be able to detect it and to learn all vetos from the cheater in order to remove them. Using existing signature schemes such as [1] , it is possible to design such a veto system and, in case someone uses more than his number of vetos, the cheater is identified. Unfortunately the cheater's vetos remain anonymous, hence it is not possible to discard them. While with our ring signature scheme, all cheater's vetos can be discarded without restarting the elaboration of the program committee.
For these two applications, we design a ring signature that offers the following security properties:
• A new signature cannot be forged without knowing a secret signature key.
• Each group signer i can have his own number of authorized signatures k i which is determined when the public key is set up.
• If a signer i signs a number of messages lower or equal to his authorized number of signatures k i , it is not possible to determine which member of the group has signed the message. Moreover, no one can determine if two signatures have been generated with the same secret signature key (anonymity).
• If a signer i signs more than his authorized number of signatures k i then anybody can link all his signatures (linkability) and also determine the identity of the cheater (traceability).
• Linkability and traceability properties exist only if the signatures are generated for the same event: for instance the first and the second round of an election are two different events. In this paper, we propose a k-times full traceable ring signature that has all these features. a) Contributions: We define a cryptographic primitive called k-times full traceable ring signature. This primitive allows everyone to publicly trace all signatures of a group member who has produced more than his personal threshold number of signatures k during a specified event. Existing results in the literature only allow to link or open two of these signatures. We give a formal definition of our primitive and its security properties. More precisely, we have full anonymity of the signer if he does not over pass his threshold value. Moreover the ring signature verification key is only composed of the public key of each member, so it is easy to construct by an ad-hoc group of users with different thresholds for each user. Finally, the produced signatures are linear in the group size times the maxium of thresholds. We also give proofs of this scheme in the random oracle model (ROM).
Our k-times full traceable ring signature primitive can be used to design an anonymous veto mechanism for the steering committee where vetos are anonymous signatures on program committe names that are not desired. This mechanism can detect members that use more vetos than expected and remove cheater's vetos while preserving the anonymity of other users. It can also be used to organize elections with multiple proxy votes such that when a user signs more ballots that he should, everybody can open all his signatures. b) Related Works: Group and ring signatures are two well known cryptographic primitives that first appeared respectively in [4] and [5] . Both primitives allow users to anonymously sign a digital document within a group. In group signatures, a special authority manages the group using a manager secret key, while in ring signatures, members manage the group themselves in an ad-hoc manner. In [6] , the authors present a scheme where the size of a signature is constant, i.e. it does not depend to the group size. Some group/ring signature schemes deal with linkability. Linkable ring signatures are first defined in [7] . In this paper, the authors present a ring signature that allows users to publicly link two signatures produced by the same user within the group. The security model of this primitive are formalized in [8] . Although the signature size grows linearly with the group size in most schemes, there exists constant size signatures such as [9] and [10] . The main applications of linkable signature are e-voting and e-cash, but this property is also used in several other applications, such as the direct anonymous attestation scheme described in [11] .
In [12] , Canard et al. present list signatures that add a property to linkable group signature: the identity of the signer of two linked signatures can be publicly computed. Few years later, Canard et al. give a list signature construction for ad-hoc group based on ring signature [2] . In this scheme, the signature size grows linearly with the group size. In [13] , the authors give a constant size identity-based ring signature scheme with similar properties (linkability and traceability).
Anonymous authentication is closely related to group/ring signatures. For instance, k-times anonymous authentications [14] , [15] , [16] allow a group member to anonymously authenticate himself k times, but the (k + 1) th authentication allows the verifier to trace his identity. In [1] the authors adapt k-times anonymous authentications to linkable group signatures. This signature primitive allows everyone to trace a user that has produced more than k signatures by linking two of theses signatures. This primitive can be viewed as a generalization of list signature schemes. However, the generalization is incomplete since only two signatures among k + 1 are linked, and the anonymity of the signer is publicly revealed only for these two signatures but his other signatures remain anonymous. Moreover, the number k is the same for each group member. To the best of our knowledge, there exists no ring signature that ensures full anonymity for members that produce less than k signatures, and public full linkability/traceability on all signatures of a member after the (k + 1) th signature (for a personal bound k). Solving this problem is the goal of our k-times full traceable ring signature primitive. c) Outline: In the next section, we recall some cryptographic notions. In Section III, we present our security models. In Section IV, we give our scheme and discuss about its security. In Section V, we give applications of our scheme. Finally, we conclude in Section VI.
II. CRYPTOGRAPHIC TOOLS
We present some cryptographic assumptions and some results on zero knowledge proofs. First, we recall the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption and his bilinear variant.
Definition 1 (Decisional Diffie-Hellman [17] which is an instance of 2BDDH. Then, knowing an algorithm that solves the 2BDDH problem, we can deduce an algorithm that solves the BDDH problem in a similar runing time. It is possible to construct a similar reduction using type 2 pairing. Unfortunately, the same reduction does not work for type 3 but the problem seems to be at least as hard as in the type 1 or type 2 cases.
Definition 4 (Zero-knowledge proofs [20] If we only have one transaction from the prover to the verifier, we say that the ZKP is non-interactive (NIZKP). In the litterature, sigma protocols are ZKP with three exchanges between the prover and the verifier: a commitment, a challenge, and a response (by example the Schnorr protocol [21] ). If the challenge is chosen on a large set, it is possible to transform a sigma protocol into a NIZKP using the FiatShamir heuristic [22] replacing the challenge by the digest of a hash function on the commitment.
Finally, our scheme uses the generic transformation of ZKP designed by [23] . The authors propose a generic transformation from the ZKP of the solution to some problem instance to a ZKP of the solution to one problem instance out of n problem instances (without revealing this problem instance). This transformation holds with any sigma protocol. The computational and space cost of the resulting ZKP is n times the cost of the primary ZKP. It is possible to use the FiatShamir transformation on such a ZKP to obtain an equivalent NIZKP.
III. MODEL AND SECURITY
We first formally define k-times full traceable ring signature (k-FTRS) scheme, next we define the security models.
Let k be the maximum of authorized anonymous signatures then a k-FTRS is a ring signature scheme that has three additional functionalities depending on the parameter k:
• (i) a link algorithm allows users to link two signatures produced by the same member who has produced more than k signatures; • (ii) a match algorithm extracts the identity of a member u and a tracer, denoted by ω (E,u) , from two linked signatures for the same event E; • (iii) a trace algorithm allows users to decide whether a signature has been produced by the user u for the same event E, using the corresponding tracer ω (E,u) . Each group member has his own parameter k u that is used to generate his pair of signing/verification key. Thus, to publicly detect a cheater who has produced more than k u signatures in a set of r signatures, it suffices to use the link algorithm on all pairs of signatures. The match algorithm allows users to identify the cheater and returns a tracer ω (E,u) . Using this tracer and the trace algorithm, everyone can detect all other signatures produced by the identified cheater. The number of calls to the link algorithm is quadratic in r and the the number of calls to the trace algorithm is linear in r.
As it is often required in linkable signatures, all signatures are computed for a particular event. Thus, link, match and trace algorithms can be only used for signatures coming from the same event. More formally, the signature algorithm requires a bit string E, called an event, that corresponds to the identification of a given event (for example the concatenation of the date, title and the location of the election). 
Definition 5 (k-times full traceable ring signature (k-FTRS)). A k-FTRS is defined by the followings algorithms:
Else, let svk u be the key of the signer u who has produced σ 1 and
This algorithm checks that the signature σ of m for the set of public keys L has been produced in the event E by the user u using the tracer ω (E,u) . In this case it returns 1, else 0.
The following definition presents the correctness of such a scheme. Loosely speaking, a k-FTRS is correct when the algorithms Ver, Link, Match and Trace correctly work using signatures coming from the algorithm Sig.
Definition 6 (Correctness). We say that a k-FTRS is correct if for any key pair (ssk
The first point checks the verification algorithm works correctly for any signature generated by the algorithm Sig. The second one shows that the algorithm Link outputs 1 if the two given signatures use the same witnesss j and the same signature key ssk i . The third point ensures that the algorithm Match outputs the verification key associated to two given linked signatures. The last point verifies that the tracer and the verification signature key svk i outputed by the algorithm Match allow the algorithm Trace to trace all the signatures produced by ssk i .
We formalize the following properties of k-FTRS: Unforgeability: It is computationally infeasible to forge a valid signature without the secret key of a group member. Traceability: More then k signatures coming from the same user in the same event are always traceable. Anonymity: It is computationally infeasible to determine the identity of an honest user from less than (k + 1) of his signatures for each event. Our security models are based on [8] that formalizes the security of linkable ring signatures.
Unforgeability: A k-FTRS is unforgeable when there exists no polynomial adversary able to create a new valid signature for the group. The adversary has access to a signature oracle that computes signatures for given messages and events using the secret key of chosen user. To win the adversary must generate a valid signature that does not come from the oracle. In what follow, we denote by out O the set of all the values outputed by the oracle O during an experiment. Unforgeability is defined as follows.
Definition 7 (EUF-CMA security). Let P be a k-FTRS of security parameter t and let A be a polynomial time adversary.
We define the (n, k)-existential unforgeability against chosen message attack experiment for A against P as follows: Exp
Traceability: A k-FTRS is traceable when there exists no polynomial adversary who is able to generate at least k valid signatures for the same event knowing only one secret key from the group such that the match and trace algorithms fail to trace the corresponding public key on each signatures. To help him, the adversary has access to a signature oracle that computes signatures for given messages and given events using secret keys of chosen users. This property is formally given in the following definition.
Definition 8 (Traceability). Let P be a k-FTRS of security parameter t and let A = (A 1 , A 2 ) be a pair of algorithm in POLY(t). We define the (n, k)-traceability experiment for adversary A against P as follows: Exp
and 
Anonymity: A k-FTRS is anonymous when there exists no polynomial adversary able to distinguish the signer of a given message between two given honest group members. The adversary chooses two honest user's public keys, a group of users, a message and an event, the he sends it to the challenger. The challenger signs the message using one of the two corresponding secret keys. Then the adversary must guess who the signer is. To help him, the adversary has access to a signature oracle that computes signatures for given messages and given events using the secret key of chosen users. However, the oracle does not produce more that k − 1 signatures for the two chosen public keys and the corresponding event used to produce the challenge since signatures would be traceable in this case. This notion is formally introduced in the following definition.
Definition 9 (Anonymity). Let P be a k-FTRS of security parameter t and let A = (A 1 , A 2 ) be polynomial time adversary. We define the (n, k)-anonymity experiment for adversary A against P as follows: Exp 
IV. OUR CONSTRUCTION: KTRACE
We present the scheme Ktrace, a secure construction of our primitive. It is based on the list signature scheme for small groups of Canard et al. [2] . We first recall this scheme.
A. Canard et al. List Signature Scheme
Each member generates an ElGamal secret/public key pair (sk = x, pk = g x ) for g a generator of a prime order multiplicative group. Let I be the set of user identities. The group key GPK = {pk i } i∈I is the set of all member's public keys. To sign a message m for the event E, we use two hash functions H 0 and H 1 to compute the hashed values A = H 1 (E, 0), B = H 1 (E, 1) and u = H 0 (m, E, 1). Finally, we compute
x , and we compute T 3 an ad-hoc NIZKP of the knowledge of the two values x and i such that x = log g (pk i ) = log A (T 1 ) = log B·g u (T 2 ). The signature of m is the triplet (T 1 , T 2 , T 3 ) . The verification algorithm consists in checking the NIZKP T 3 . Furthermore, to link two signatures σ 1 = (T 1,1 , T 1,2 , T 1,3 ) and σ 2 = (T 2,1 , T 2,2 , T 2,3 ) , it suffices to check that T 1,1 = T 2,1 . Finally, to match the identity of a signer using two signatures, we compute
which is equal to the public key pk = g x . This scheme allows users to produce only one anonymous signature per key. As a consequence, it suffices to generate k keys per user to allow them to produce k anonymous signatures. Moreover, any extra signature can be linked to one of the first k signatures because a user must use the same key twice to produce more than k signatures. However this solution does not allow users to recover all the messages of a cheater.
B. An Helpful ZKP
In order to have all the necessary tools to construct our scheme, we build the following ZKP, denoted Π.
Let G 1 , G 2 and G t be three groups of prime order p, g 1 and g 2 be two respective generators of G 1 and G 2 , e : G 1 × G 2 → G t be a non-degenerate bilinear pairing and n be an integer. Let A, B, C, W , T 1 , T 2 , T 3 , be seven elements of G 1 , T 4 be an element of G 2 , T 5 be an element of G t and u and v be two elements of Z * p . Finally, for all i ∈ {1, · · · , n}, let (h i , l i ) be some couples of G 2 1 . Using
We first describe in Figure 1 the interactive case Π 1 where n = 1, hence there is only one couple (h, l). It is based on the classical methodology of ZKP of discrete logarithm knowledge [21] and equality of two discrete logarithms [24] . This proof is by construction a sigma-protocol.
Lemma 10. The ZKP Π 1 is complete, sound, and honestverifier zero-knowledge.
See Appendix A, for the proof of Lemma 10. As Π 1 is honest-verifier zero knowledge and a sigma protocol, we can use the generic transformation of [23] to obtain the interactive version of our proof for any n ≥ 0. Finally, using this transformation and the Fiat-Shamir heuristic on Π 1 , we build the non-interactive proof Π in the random oracle model. 
− −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− →
Ax = R 1 · T 1 ; Bx · g u·ȳ 1 = R 2 · S u 0 · T 2 Cx · W v·ȳ = R 3 · S v 1 · T 3 ; gz 2 = Q 0 · T 4 e(W, T 4 )ȳ = S 2 · T 5 ; gx 1 = R 0 · h ; gȳ 1 = S 0 · l
Theorem 11. The NIZKP Π is complete, sound, and zeroknowledge in the random oracle model.
It is a direct implication of [23] and Lemma 10.
C. Our Construction: Ktrace
Our construction, given in Scheme 1, requires three groups 
xi as in the scheme [2] except that
. Thus, using these two values, two signatures can be linked when the same secret key is used, and it is possible to deduce the public key g xi . As in list signatures, the signer computes in T 6 a non-interactive proof that all other parts of the signatures T 1 , T 2 , T 3 , T 4 and T 5 are "correctly formed" according to one of the verification keys of the group using the proof Π given in Section IV-B. The complete signature is the tuple (T 1 , T 2 , T 3 , T 4 , T 5 , T 6 ) and is verified by checking the validity of the proof T 6 .
Note that using two linked signatures with respective third terms 
Let I be the set of user indexes such that:
We set:
The algorithm computes the following set: 
This algorithm computes:
It also computes:
Finally, it returns 1 if the proof T 6 is valid for Π (see section IV-B) according to the set of instances S.
This algorithm returns 1 if and only if
This algorithm computes the following hashed values:
If such an element does not exist then this algorithm outputs ⊥, else this algorithm outputs
(svk i , ω (E,i) ). Trace E (L, σ, m, ω (E,i) ): This algorithm set σ = (T 1 , T 2 , T 3 , T 4 , T 5 , T 6 ). If Ver E (L, σ, m) = 1 and e(ω (E,i) , T 4 ) = T 5 then it returns 1, else 0.
D. Correctness
Theorem 12. Ktrace is correct.
Proof. Ver: The set of instances S is similarly computed in both algorithms Sig and Ver. The part T 6 of a signature is a proof Π on the set of instances S. Since the verification algorithm constists to check this proof, and since Π is complete, then algorithm Ver is correct, i.e.
Using the same event E, the same secret key ssk i = (x i , {x i,j } 1≤j≤k ) and the same witness j, the first part of the signature is T 1 = A xi,j where A = H 0 (E, 0). Let T 1,1 and T 2,1 be the first part of the two signatures (σ 1 , σ 2 ), clearly
outputs the public key of the signer svk i :
Then the algorithm outputs svk i = (g xi , {g xi,j } 1≤j≤ki ) which is the public key corresponding to ssk i . Trace: Given two signatures σ 1 = Sig E (ssk i , m 1 , L 1 , j) and
such that:
Then, using any m, E, L and l, we show that
xi , we have:
E. Security
According to the security model introduced in Section III, we have the following theorem. Full proof of this theorem will appear in the full version of this paper. In the following, we just give some proof intuitions for each properties.
(n,k)-EUF-CMA security: In order to build a valid signature of m using E, the adversary must to compute a valid NIZKP in T 6 . This proof convinces the verifier that the signer has used a valid secret key ssk according to the set of public keys L. As a consequence, since the NIZKP is sound, the signer cannot generate a valid signature except with negligible probability.
(n, k)-traceability: In a similar way, as Π is sound, a signature that success the verification check is correctly constructed. Since the adversary is not able to forge a signature using the secret key of an honest user under the soundness of Π, the traceability of Ktrace is a direct implication of the correctness of the algorithms link, match and trace.
(n, k)-anonymity: . Finally, it is computationally infeasible to guess the identity of an honest user from one of its signatures under the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption in G 1 and the 2-bilinear decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption.
F. Performances
The performances of the scheme Ktrace depend of n the number of users in the group and k = max 0≤i≤n (k i ) the maximum in the set of all user threshold values k i . The secret key of each user contains at most (k + 1) elements of Z * p , i.e. the size of the public key of each user is (k + 1) · s p where s p = log 2 (p) is the bit size of the elements of Z * p . Thus, the group public key size is (k + 1) · n · s 1 where s 1 is the bit size of an element of G 1 .
In the signature algorithm, we use the NIZKP Π which is constructed using the generic transformation [23] on Π 1 . The size of this NIZKP is 6·s 1 +s 2 +s T +3·s p where s 2 is the bit size of an element of G 2 and s T is the bit size of an element of G t . The size of a NIZKP built from [23] is x times the size of the original proof, where x is the number of instances used. In our scheme, the cardinal of the set of instances S = {(Q, g xi , g xi,j )} (i,j)∈I×{1,··· ,ki} is at most n·k. Then the size of the NIZKP is bounded by
The complexity of the signing algorithm and the verification algorithm are in O(n · k).
The complexity of the three algorithms link, match and trace are constant. Moreover, the tracer outputted by the match algorithm is also in constant size s 1 . According to the comparative table in Figure 2 , we show that the signature size of our scheme loses at least a factor k compared to other ring signature schemes, particulary comparing to the list signature scheme [2] . However, it is the only one which is k-times, adhoc and fully traceable together. Note that a 1-times scheme is allways full traceable by construction.
Finally, note that in both applications given in the next section, k is a priori much smaller than n. Moreover, our applications do not implicate that k increases when n does. Thus, depending to the context, the signature size O(n · k) can be often considered to be relatively closed to O(n).
V. APPLICATIONS

A. k-times Proxy E-Voting
Linkability in group and ring signatures is a useful property to design cryptographic e-voting schemes. As a matter of fact, one can built a simple e-voting scheme from any linkable group signature scheme as follows. To vote for the candidate c, the voter signs c in σ using a linkable group signature scheme. He then publishes (c, σ) on a public bulletin board. The bulletin board is a publicly readable storage such that everybody can write data on the board but it is not possible to discard any data from it. To compute the result of the election, it is sufficient to remove all non-valid signatures according to the group public key and all linked signatures, and to count the number of ballots for each candidate. Such a scheme presents several properties:
• Ballots are anonymous thanks to the anonymity of the group signature.
• A voter cannot vote more than his number of authorized vote thanks to the linkability of the group signature.
• The result of the election can be publicly computed by anyone.
• Using linkable ring signature, this scheme does not require any manager or trust party.
• Using event oriented signatures, voters can use the same keys for several elections. In a multi-group context, using the group identity as event allows the users to use the same signing key for different groups.
• Using traceable signatures, the identity of a cheater is public, and it is possible to revoke the cheaters. On the other hand, k-times schemes can be used to design such an e-voting scheme with proxy mechanism. In proxy voting, a signer who receives a proxy vote from another one must be able to vote one more time. Thus, any voter can vote k times where k is the number of proxy that he has received. Of course, if the voter votes more than k times, he must be traced and revoked. In this case, we would like to discard all votes of the cheater during the counting of votes. However, such a property cannot be achieved with a basic k-times signature scheme since it is not full traceable. To solve this problem, we propose the following k-times proxy e-voting scheme based on our k-FTRS scheme. Setup: Each voter uses Gen to generate secret/public keys depending on his number of proxy k. The voters construct the group public key GPK which is the set of all voters public keys. Initialization of an election: Users choose the event E and the set of candidates C. Voting protocol: Each user chooses k candidates (c 1 , . . . , c k ) ∈ C k and publishes on the public bulletin board the ballots (c j , Sig E (ssk, c j , GPK, j)) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , k} using his secret key svk. Counting of votes: Copy all ballots from the bulletin board.
First, everyone removes each ballot which contains invalid signature using the algorithm Ver. Then anyone uses the Link algorithm on each pair of ballots, and the Match algorithm on each pair of linked ballots to obtain the cheaters identities and the corresponding tracers. For each tracer, we can use the Trace algorithm on each ballot, and remove it if Trace returns 1. Finally, everyone counts the number of ballots for each candidate and deduces the election winner. Note that cheaters can also be revoked of the group for the future elections.
B. k-times Anonymous Veto
A k-times anonymous veto allows members of a group to anonymously express k vetos. For example, during the organization of a conference, the members of the steering committee constitute the list of members of the technical committee. For some reason, a member of the steering committee might want to refuse the designation of some people on this list. However, members who exclude people might want to be anonymous. On the other hand, it is desirable that the number of people excluded per member is limited to a fixed value k. Members who exceed the limit must be revoked to the steering committee. In this case, it is necessary to discard all requests produced by the revoked members. Such a veto scheme can be easily designed using a k-FTRS scheme: Setup: Each group member uses Gen to generate secret/public keys depending to his number of veto k. The members construct the group public key GPK which is the set of all members public keys. Initialization: Users choose the event E and the set of items C. Veto protocol: Each member chooses l items (c 1 , . . . , c l ) ∈ C k such that l ≤ k. To veto each item c j , the member publish on the public bulletin board the witness (c j , Sig E (ssk, c j , GPK, j)) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , l} using his secret key svk. Cheater detection: Anybody can use the following procedure to detect a member who places more than k vetos:
we use Link algorithm on each pair of witness, and Match algorithm on each pair of linked witness to obtain the cheater's identities and the corresponding tracers. Thanks to Match, it is possible to revoke the cheaters. Finding invalid witness: All witnesses which contain an invalid signature are invalid. If the previous procedure detects cheaters, the Trace algorithm is used on each witness for each tracer outputted by Match. If Trace outputs 1 then the corresponding witness is invalid.
Limitation of other k-times schemes:
Since other schemes in the literature are not full traceable, they present some limitation for building k-times anonymous veto schemes. Without full traceability, it is not possible to discard all witnesses produced by a cheater. However, the cheater is revoked, so he is no longer in the committee, and he no longer has the right to exclude people from the list. In this case, other members of the committee have no other choice but to restart the veto procedure since other witness of the cheater remain anonymous. Our scheme allows to solve this problem.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we give a more general definition of ktimes linkable/traceable signatures and their security. Our construction allows members to chose a different threshold k for each group member, and anybody can trace all signatures generated by the same member. Future work will investigate the design of such a scheme with smaller (or constant) size of signature. On the other hand, we aim at designing k-times full traceable schemes using the same methodology on other existing linkable/traceable ring/group signatures.
